Administrative procedures in the sphere of EU law are increasingly integrated. In many cases, both Member State authorities as well as EU institutions and bodies contribute to a single procedure, irrespective of whether the final decision is taken on the national or the European level. 2 Member State decisions, under EU law, will often be given effect beyond the territory of the issuing state (referred to in the following as trans-territorial acts). Trans-territorial acts are also often referred to as trans-national acts. The latter term is slightly misleading since it is not the nation which is the relevant point of reference but the fact that generally under public law, due to the principle of territoriality, the legal effect of a decision under public law is limited to the territory of the state which issues the decision and the reach of its law. EU law allows for certain acts to have an effect beyond this territorial reach within the entire territory of the EU, and in the case of extraterritorial effect of an act also beyond the EU. 
The procedural provisions for the various policies differ in detail. In EU administrative law, rules and principles on the creation and distribution of information exist in several policy areas with differing degrees of detail. 16 These rules establishing composite procedures govern 'who' has to generate information by 'which means' and in 'which quality' from 'which source' and 'how' this information will be used prior to taking normative or singlecase decisions. Several basic constellations exist. In some policy areas the procedures are straightforward, insofar as they provide for an administrative procedure to take place basically within one Member State, supported by information transferred to it from other Member States and European institutions and bodies. Other policy area provisions provide for a multiple-step composite procedure. An example is to require one Member State's authority to act as reference authority taking the decision for the admission of certain hazardous products to the entire single market of the EU. 17 In some policy areas, the composite nature of a procedure links different authorities. A procedure may begin in a Member State, to then continue with input from an EU agency or other Member State agencies before the European Commission. Such is for example the case in the procedure for the admission of novel foods to the single market. 18 Other procedures are continuously undertaken on the European level with the possibility of Member State procedural input, e.g. in the area of admission of medicines to the market. 19 Irrespective of the details of these different constellations, the various procedures have one thing in common.
The composite nature of the procedure always consists of one form or another of cooperation either vertically between Member States and the European authorities or horizontally between different Member State authorities. Also the mix between vertical and horizontal cooperation is possible. However, all forms of cooperation are essentially based on procedures to jointly obtain and assess information necessary for a final decision. Information cooperation is therefore at the heart of rules and procedures governing EU administrative law. Understanding the legal challenges arising from composite procedures thus requires an understanding of vertical and horizontal cooperation for obtaining and computing information leading to final administrative decisions and acts. 20 16 The legal basis of administrative obligations to establish, gather and distribute information arises from general principles of EU law, sometimes expressly established in norms of EU/EC Treaty provisions, as well as, occasionally, in EU/EC legislative acts. The latter are, with few exceptions, policy specific. The rules and principles are so far mainly established with respect to individual policy areas. However, certain standard structures to handle information gathering and exchange have been developed for example by cross-policy provisions on access to documents and data protection. 20 Rules and principles on the substance of information exist. They are either specified in specific policy area related legislation, or exist as general principles of law, applicable throughout the EU by EU institutions and bodies as well as by Member States acting within the sphere of EU law. For example, general principles of EU law such as the duty of care or the duty to diligent and impartial examination require that all relevant information be collected and assessed as to its potential influence on a final decision prior to a final administrative decision or act being taken. (See, in particular, Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002] OUP, Oxford 2006, 374, 375) . In the The substance of composite procedures is thus rules and principles of EU administrative law establishing the legal framework for the generation and sharing of information within the administrative networks. In a very brief and therefore necessarily limited overview, the procedures for generation and sharing information are the following:
Generation of information takes place either through private parties requesting an authorisation or filing a complaint with a national or European body or institution. Both are capable of starting a composite procedure.
Depending on the procedures, authorisations need to be either requested directly from a Community body or requested from Member State authorities. 21 An example for many procedures is the composite procedure applicable for placing on the market genetically modified food stuffs referred to as 'novel foods' and food ingredients. 22 Under this procedure, an applicant wishing to introduce a genetically modified organism or products containing these into circulation in the single market needs to request an authorisation with a competent national authority. This request triggers a complex procedure with horizontal and vertical cooperation of European and diverse national actors. The example of novel foods is not singular. Similar procedures in which composite procedures govern authorisations to be required by Member State authorities which then set in motion a joint procedure exist, for example with respect to the admission of certain medical products and the rules on production of environmentally dangerous products. 23 The procedures are designed to provide the administrative actors in charge with the relevant information to enable it to make an informed decision.
Generation of information also takes place through information sharing. Obligations to provide information to administrative actors within the EU arise, firstly, through the obligation to grant mutual assistance, secondly, through ad hoc or reoccurring reporting duties and, thirdly, through the establishment of formalised information networks, for example in the context of European agencies. All three forms exist in parallel within different policy areas. Often these structures have resulted in the development of joint planning structures.
Mutual assistance will generally either be granted to provide information or to enforce a decision taken by another administrative body. Obligations to assist other administrations exist in the 'vertical' relation between Community bodies and the Member State authorities as well as in the 'horizontal' relation between Member States. They may be single-case exchanges of information or continuous provision of information. 24 Mutual case law of the ECJ and the CFI the duty to care is closely linked to the audi alteram partem rule and is now regarded to be part of the general principles protected within the framework of the right to good administration. Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000, OJ 2000 C 364/1(See e.g. Case T-7/92 Asia Motor France SA v Commission [1993] ECR II-669, para 34). The principle of loyal cooperation between the EU institutions and the Member States arising from Article 10 EC, also requires both Member States and the EU institutions and bodies to contribute to the achievement of Community tasks. 21 With the request for authorisation and the subsequent administrative decisions, the party requesting the authorisation -an individual or a public body -will be required to provide more or less substantive information on the planned project. A second step is often the coordination with other Member States or the continuation of the procedure by an EU agency or institution. 24 The main provision in primary law establishing the obligations for mutual assistance in the vertical relation between Member States and Community bodies is Article 10 EC, which includes the obligation to assist in administrative procedures by provision of existing information (But since most obligations on information sharing are established in specific secondary law, the possible obligations of the Community institutions vis-à-vis the Member States under Article 10 EC remain largely unexplored. See also: Alberto Gil Ibañez, The assistance generally is based on the concept of the territorial reach of public authority. Therefore, the exercise of information gathering in a Member State is generally the prerogative of the local authorities, acting under their home procedural rules. 25 The rules on administrative mutual assistance have increasingly evolved towards rules establishing administrative networks with specific roles given to the different players therein, 26 in which the single-case aspect of mutual assistance is less and less prevalent in many areas having been replaced with continuous information requirements. Also, in many policy areas the difference between rules on mutual assistance, on one hand, and the participation of administrations in composite procedures, on the other hand, is fluid. Both have in common that the administrations act upon an obligation under EU law or Europeanised national law to support another administration by providing information.
Additionally, the rules on mutual assistance in collecting data have been developed in many policy areas towards networks of information gathering, exchange and composition. 27 The transfer from mutual assistance to information networks is gradual and evolutionary. The strongest development towards establishing information networks specifically designed for exchange of information can be identified in the area of risk-regulation. Often
Administrative Supervision and Enforcement of EC Law, Hart Publishing (Oxford, Portland 1999) 69-70). Additionally, under Article 284 EC and within the limits of primary and secondary law, the right to 'collect any information and carry out any checks required for the performance of tasks entrusted to it.' (See the directive on information about technical standards and regulations (now Directive 98/48/EC of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations , OJ 1998 L 217/18 and others). Member States and their standardisation bodies are under the obligation to inform the Commission about any draft standardisation or technical regulation in areas which are not subject to harmonisation legislation (Articles 2 and 8 of Directive 98/34/EC of 22 June 1998, OJ 1998 L 204/37 as amended). Infringements of Member States' obligation to report to the Commission any draft of technical standards and regulations can lead to its inapplicability (Case C-194/94 CIA Security International [1996] 25 Member States are, where there is no harmonisation of law, in some policy areas encouraged to regulate the specifics of horizontal mutual assistance in agreements or 'common accords' amongst themselves. This is explicitly established e.g. in the rules on customs law in Article 47 of Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, OJ 1997 L 82/1, stating that 'Member States may decide by common accord whether procedures are needed to ensure the smooth operation of the mutual-assistance arrangements provided for in this Regulation (…).' In the area of tax law a similar provision exists in 26 The rules on mutual assistance have developed 'in sink' with the general development of the EU legal system. Originally, the vertical relation was stressed with the obligations laid down in what is now Article 10 EC, the duty to loyal cooperation. Then, in the phase of the development of single market related case law by the ECJ in the nineteen-seventies the focus also turned to horizontal cooperation between administrations for exchange of information on the admission of certain products on the market (see e. information networks will be established or supported by European agencies. 28 The information within these networks will generally be provided by participants of the networks -both public and private from the European and the Member State levels. Generally, the 'giving' side of information into a network has no control over the information or any unilateral possibility to withhold information. 29 The latter characteristic poses specific problems with respect to rights of individuals whose information is supplied to a network. 30 The latter can be accessed by any agency participating in the network. 31 Examples for information networks include the newer rules relating to ozone in ambient air. 32 Also, in the area of veterinary and food safety law where the 'Rapid Alert System' is aimed at fast exchange of information on foodstuffs which do not comply with Community food safety standards between the national authorities, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the
Commission. 33
Information gathering and sharing also takes place through investigation procedures in the form of controls, inspections and auditing procedures. 34 Powers to request such investigations are conferred by EU law on the 28 However, the existence and maintenance of information networks between different levels of administrations are not entirely dependent on a European agency. Examples for such networks based directly on horizontal cooperation between Member State on the basis of EU legal provisions are for example prominent in the area of areas in which Member States are highly protective of their rights such as tax law (In tax law, for example, the area of the joint administration of the so called 'value added tax' is subject to regulation. The relevant regulation creates a 'common communication network (CCN) and common system interface (CSI),' to ensure all transmissions by electronic means between competent authorities in the area of customs and taxation. 34 Such powers differ from the obligation to provide for mutual assistance by the fact that mutual assistance is generally on an ad-hoc basis and is undertaken under the rules of procedure of the administrations 'giving' the information.
Commission or other EU institutions and bodies for investigative activities in Member States as well as on
Member States to request an investigation in another EU Member State. 35 Cooperation procedures for joint investigations include rights to request information and documentation from public or private bodies, the right to review documentation such as books and electronic databases of the subjects to the investigations, the right to access premises in on-spot investigations, the right to request on-spot information and explanations by employees, the confiscation of goods and documentation, the taking of samples, the sealing of premises and, finally, the use of enforcement measures such as fines and force to enforce the rights of inspection. Far reaching powers for investigation are for example granted to the European anti-fraud unit of the Commission -OLAF. 36 On the Community level, some of the most detailed rules on investigations are probably to be found in the area of competition law. 37 Investigations can however also be pursued by private parties on the basis of an authorisation of a public body. Such authorisation can be given either by an administrative decision or by means of entering into a contractual relation. In the area of environmental law, private partners take on roles within the 'European Information Observation Network' (Eionet). 38 In this, the European Environment Agency coordinates a network of public and private actors by allocating specific tasks, including investigations into certain topics, to public and private members of the network. Many of these powers are exercised in the framework of cooperative administration in the form of composite procedures. Generally, the law applicable to such investigation measures as well as to the protection of rights of the subjects of investigations is a mix of EU law and law of the Member States. Where Member State authorities establish information, it will often be subject to specific procedural and institutional obligations on the form and procedure of such activity based in EU. 44 Procedurally, investigation powers are often enhanced by the power to request information through an 'injunction.' 45 Information generation and sharing within administrative networks sourcing also takes place in joint planning procedures, between Member State and European institutions. Plans are aimed at coordinating different actors and establishing a framework for later decisions by either Community institutions or Member State institutions.
Planning procedures are often general but highly detailed information collection and assessment procedures designed to create a base for later individual decisions. In the area of emissions trading, for example, the relevant directive establishes a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. Each Member State is periodically obliged to develop a national plan for the allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances in accordance with criteria set out by the Directive. These plans are public and have to subject to a comments procedure, thus linking public and private information-gathering procedures.
III

Decisions and Acts as Outcome of Composite Procedures
Horizontal and vertical cooperation procedures allow the establishing and generating of the necessary information for final decision making. These procedures also allow for participation of interests touched by a final decision in other Member States and are designed to enhance mutual acceptability and applicability of decisions created in the European administrative network applicable throughout the EU. Integrated procedures lead to basically two results: The first are decisions and acts of the Member States. These can, due to EU law, undertaking the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the request to the competent authority of the Member State within the territory of which the undertaking's seat is situated, together with a statement of the reasons why that information is required" 43 See for example in the area of agricultural law, Article 7 (2), (3) and (4) have effect beyond the territory of the issuing state (trans-territorial acts). Acts by Member States with transterritorial effect are often acts and decisions as the result of a composite procedure with input from other Member States and/or EU institutions and bodies. The second type of outcome of integrated procedures isare decisions from EU institutions and bodies. Input to decision-making on the EU level through administrative actors of Member States in composite procedures can either be through acts which are preparatory in nature or through forms of formalised cooperation. Also, in certain cases, forms of joint bodies such as Comitology committees are created, which not only play a role in administrative rule-making but may also be authorised to participate in individual decision -making.
The legal framework for composite procedures arises from EU law. However, very few provisions exist in EU law, which are applicable throughout various policy areas. Most are policy-specific. Amongst the few general provisions are the Comitology decision, directives on data protection as well as directives on access to information. Additional sources of general EU administrative law arise from general principles and fundamental rights. They apply within the sphere of EU law irrespective of the applicable law to the procedure, which can be national or European.
But this general EU administrative law, except for the comitology decision, generally does not establish any specific procedural rules on supervision and review. Policy-specific law generally leaves to the Member States to establish the procedure as well as the conditions for supervision and judicial control of administrative action to the respective participation of the legal orders of the Member States or to EU law with respect to EU institutions 49 General principles of EU law are equally applicable such as the 'duty to care' are uniformly applicable to Member States acting within the sphere of EU law and EU institutions and bodies themselves. This for example addresses the question of which standards the information needs to be collected is addressed in many policy areas in which it will not be sufficient for administrations to rely on using pre-existing knowledge in the administrations or relying on information provided by the parties. Instead, decisions will have to be rested on scientific expertise, created in compliance with specific standards inherent to the scientific method and 'founded on the principles of excellence, transparency and independence' in order to ensure the scientific objectivity of the measures and preclude any arbitrary measures.' (For a background to the discussion see the contributions to Christian Joerges, Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Ellen Vos (eds. and bodies. The result is a developing integrated administration with a lack of procedural rules governing the interaction and accountability of joint procedures.
IV Supervision and Remedies -The Situation and Possibilities of Improvement
The contribution to a composite procedure. This includes the consequences of errors during the Member State element of the procedure, the applicable language regime of the administrative procedure, 52 and last but not least, the criteria and conditions for judicial review of an act adopted by a Member State authority. In this system, despite trans-territorial effect of an act, judicial review will generally be only possible in the jurisdiction which issued the act. These issues are central to the problems of effective accountability and supervision of administrative activity in the EU's network administration. It is possible that individuals who have neither had any real possibility to know about a Member State's involvement in and its contribution to an administrative procedure will be subject to the effects of its outcome and will have to attempt to remedy potential flaws in an act which is in force unless withdrawn or declared void by a court, in a language and a legal system which they are unaccustomed to. The language regime is only one of the aspects to the structure. One of the essential rights of citizens in the EU is to be able to communicate with institutions and bodies of the EU in their language and to be able to obtain a copy of all rules and single-case decisions affecting them directly or indirectly in their respective language. With a decentralised administration in the EU which takes decisions and issues acts with trans-territorial effect, this general right is limited to the language of the issuing country. Given that for example a Latvian administration's decision will be able to take effect vis-à-vis individuals in Greece and the amount of Latvian speakers in Greece will most likely be very limited the dimension of the problem should become very clear. Responsibility for an act is also difficult to establish from 
CASE-LAW EXAMPLES
Two e cases illustrate the kind of difficulties of judicial review with respect to composite procedures. 56
(a) Borelli
The first example is Borelli, which arose in the early 1990s as an action for annulment against a Commission decision. Borelli is an olive oil producer who had applied for a subsidy under the European agricultural funds to construct an oil mill in Italy. The procedure provided for in the Community legislation on the distribution of the funds requires the potential beneficiary of a subsidy to apply to the regional authorities, in the case of Borelli, the region of Liguria in Italy. The local authorities review the request and forward the application with an opinion via the national government to the European Commission who takes the final decision. 57 In the case of Borelli, the outside of a legal system, especially in countries with a different legal system. Federally organised states like for example Belgium and Germany have complex rules of responsibility internally, a structure like the Swedish model of agencies might be different from countries with a more hierarchic internal organisation. 
LESSONS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF COMPOSITE PROCEDURES
Given that the trend to integrating administrations seems rather inevitable in an increasingly integrated European
Union and in absence of a real central administration, the real challenge to the EU legal system is therefore to find ways to adapt the means of judicial supervision to the emerging reality of an integrated administration. This requires identifying problems in the structure of judicial review and discussing potential solutions. In the following, I would like to restrict this discussion to two major themes: One is adapting the judicial review procedure to multi-level integrated procedures, the other is adapting judicial review to the fact that much of the administrative cooperation is information exchange and thus does traditionally not qualify for judicial review on the European and national levels.
The first notion of a lack of network structures of courts in the EU might surprise at first sight. After all, one of the central innovations which was used for constitutionalising the Community legal order (and thereby taking EC and EU law out of the realm of public international law), was the creation of the preliminary reference procedure European and national actors accountable. It was thus assured that the relations between the Courts were nonhierarchic in so far as national law could not -against the explicit wording of Article 234 EC -request the exhaustion of national remedies prior to a request for preliminary ruling by the ECJ. The result was a system in which the national judge is also a Community judge and supremacy of Community law does not imply inferiority of national Courts.
The weakness of this structure thus developed in Article 234 EC and the case law interpreting it, is that only established a two-level network of courts. Only national courts have the right and obligation to request a preliminary reference from the ECJ. This cooperation of courts thus takes place in the vertical dimension in the form of a one-way relationship. Administrative forms of cooperation on the other hand have, as was shown above, developed much more complex forms of cooperation through procedures often combining various forms of vertical and horizontal cooperation. Insofar, the relation between the Courts is much more conservatively organised according to a strict separation of a two-level hierarchic system than the administrative structures in many policy areas which have evolved from a two-level structure to a network. 74 The problems arising from such a two-level vertical relation have become evident in the two case-studies of Borelli and Tillack. In these and other cases, final review of composite administrative action is supposed to include an incident review of the legality of action by other authorities acting under procedural law and often in languages unknown to the reviewing court.
This has in reality led to gaps in judicial supervision of administrative action, which given the expansion of administrative cooperation in matters highly sensitive to fundamental rights, such as for example, police and customs cooperation, environmental and immigration cooperation, can no longer be tolerated.
A potential solution to address these problems could be to broaden also the possibilities of cooperation between courts. The preliminary reference procedure under Article 234 EC was probably one of the most important and influential procedural innovations which made European integration as we know it possible. This exceptional success and can be used as an example how to proceed in other than the vertical relation but needs to be updated to the current stage of integration in order to ensure judicial protection in the face of integrated procedures.
Such update should include, first, expanding the relation between courts to allow for the ECJ to also refer questions to national courts as to the application of national law in composite procedures. This would expand the vertical relation to a two-way relation. Additionally, courts of Member States should also be authorised to obtain a preliminary ruling from courts of other Member States to review the input of other Member State administrations into a procedure, the final act of which was taken by a national administration. Expanding the judicial network would allow for effective supervision of administrative cooperation in multiple-step procedures and increase considerably the legal certainty in the system. Judicial review could be undertaken by one court but with supervision of all participants in the administrative network. Gaps in legal protection such as those apparent in Borelli and Tillack could be effectively excluded. In Borelli, the ECJ could have assumed jurisdiction and referred to Italian courts for the review of legality of the Region of Liguria's negative opinion, which was decisive for the final Commission decision declining the demand for the subsidy. In Tillack, the Belgian courts could have requested review of the legality of OLAF's demand for information. In other composite procedures, both national and European input can be reviewed in one judicial procedure.
The second element of the legal structure of a system of integrated administration which poses difficulties for judicial supervision is the nature of cooperation. As was shown earlier in this article, most forms of cooperation are in the form of exchange of information and joint procedures for establishment and exchange of information.
The nature of this activity is in many cases not regarded as a reviewable final administrative decision but a preparatory act for a final decision taken by another authority. This is generally no problem if the information is established and finally used for an administrative decision in one single jurisdiction. In composite procedures in which administrations from several jurisdictions are involved, the problem is different. Here, there is generally a lack of legal knowledge and real possibility to disentangle the legality of every kind of input into the overall information being used for the final decision. This becomes especially important with respect to European databases which are maintained and supplied by administrations from all Member States and the European level and where the information is cumulated according to topics and not sources. Administrative action through factual conduct is frequent and has in reality become increasingly important.
Factual conduct is often linked to processing and computing data in administrative networks. 76 The distribution of data is generally an activity which can have far reaching and serious impact on the rights of individuals. 77
Factual conduct can arise in the above discussed cases of preparatory acts. They are thus acts which are not aimed to produce a final change in a legal position. Instead they are aimed at adding elements to an ongoing administrative procedure through statements of fact or the transfer of preliminary information. This is often the case where the act is but one step in a multiple-phase administrative procedure on the European level or the act makes for a non-final contribution in a composite administrative procedure spanning different levels. Factual conduct will however also arise where an institution publishes information or issues public statements which do 75 The leading case is Case C-60/81 IBM [1981] ECR 2639, para 9 which defined that 'any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the legal interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action under Article 173 for a declaration that it is void.' 76 The decision to distribute information on the other hand can be subject to a procedure under 'the decisive test for finding that a breach of Community law is sufficiently serious is whether the Community institution concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion. Where that institution has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach (judgments in Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996 ] ECR I-2553 , para. 28, Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C189/94 and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Others [1996 'It is settled case-law that the non-contractual liability of the Community for the unlawful acts of its bodies, for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC, depends on fulfilment of a set of conditions, namely: the unlawfulness of the conduct alleged against the institutions, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damaged complained of.' 84
It is well imaginable that the Courts would review the order of conditions for granting damages by first finding on the illegality of an action, irrespective of whether the administration enjoyed discretion or not. The Court could then take into account material and immaterial damages. The latter could be found to exist where a right of an individual has been breached. The damage sought or awarded could in most cases of illegality be a declaration of illegality. This approach would follow the principle of qui peut le plus, peut le moins. If the Court has the right to award financial damages, it could also give satisfaction by stating the illegality and thereby contributing to the future lawful conduct of administrations. The development of such an approach to a declaratory damages action, as we might call it, would be a significant contribution to judicial review in composite administrative procedures.
B Parliamentary and Administrative Supervision
Next The standard for awarding damages to date however is stricter than simple illegality of an executive action. The ECJ has consistently requires not single illegality but a 'sufficiently serious' breach of Community law in order to award damages. Where an administration enjoys a margin of discretion, simple illegality of information exchange can however breach individual's rights to a considerable degree and merit declaration without the award of damages. Expanding the right to damage claims would allow for review of non-final acts and ensure a higher level of supervision and protection of rights in a network administration. In order to address these potential lacunas in ombudsman supervision of administrative activity, the European, national and regional ombudsmen have created the European Network of Ombudsmen. 87 The idea is to be able to transfer complaints between the European and the relevant national and regional ombudsmen. Thereby complaints should be automatically handled by the ombudsman in charge of the administration being the source of alleged maladministration. 88 However, the strict organic distinction of competences also within the network of ombudsmen can lead to difficult situations in composite administrative procedures. To address these problems a special procedure was developed through which national or regional ombudsmen may ask for written answers to queries about EU law, its interpretation and its application to special cases from the EO. The EO either provides the answer directly or, if appropriate, channels the query to another EU institution. 89
The same problem of maintenance of a two-level supervision structure holds true for most forms of administrative supervision of composite procedures. In the area of data protection, for example, the European protection cases within the European administrative network. This approach addresses the difficulties of jurisdictional limitations.
A possibly more effective solution to these problems of parliamentary and administrative supervision, however, could be the creation of an independent agency in charge of handling complaints by individuals even during an ongoing procedure. Similar to the powers of the EDPS, this agency could investigate cases of maladministration by national or European agencies in integrated procedures and take decisions before even a final decision is taken in order to prevent the need for judicial review. Such an agency, or integrated network of agencies, would be a potential network solution for a network problem. If this review procedure would be structured to allow for one single review procedure of the contributions to a composite procedure from administrations of different jurisdictions by the supervisory agencies of these jurisdictions, a real step towards developing supervisory procedures fit to the reality of integrated administrative procedures would be achieved. It would thus be a potentially appropriate approach in the face of integrated administration and create a kind of internal administrative police force, reviewing procedures before the mistakes can take effect through final acts. It would mirror by its construction and approach the integrated nature of decision making by allowing for composite realtime review. Rights of intervention of the agency would be needed to be granted vis-à-vis Member State as well as EU institutions and bodies.
V Summary and Outlook for EU Administrative Law
This contribution addressed specific legal problems arising from the development of composite administrative procedures in the EU. Composite procedures are a specific form of highly integrated administrative procedural cooperation for implementation of EU policies. The development of composite procedures in a multitude of policy areas creates problems especially with respect to supervision and accountability. Problems arise from the gap between forms of organisation: Administrative procedures are increasingly organised according to concepts of network structures. On the other hand, accountability and supervision mechanisms, especially possibilities of judicial review, mostly follow a traditional pattern of a two-level system with distinct national and European levels. Such traditionally organised supervisory structures have difficulties in allocating responsibility for errors during the procedures and finding adequate remedies for maladministration within a network. They also have difficulties coping with the fact that the substance of administrative cooperation in composite procedures is the joint gathering and subsequent sharing of information. Therefore, overcoming notions of judicial review on the basis of a final act has proven to be insufficient to ensure effective legal protection. supervision and structures to hold administrations accountable have not followed this tendency of creative development.
Solutions discussed so far in this paper are oriented to reconstruct a network structure of accountability and supervision as well as control of legality appropriate for the network of actors. Coordinating the approaches for control, supervision and accountability to the same degree as the composite procedures are integrated seems to be developing as the most sensible and viable approach. But next to the above discussed approaches for creating judicial and administrative supervision networks, there are also more far-reaching, systematic and thus to a certain degree more radical approaches possible and probably necessary.
The questions of judicial as well as administrative and political control seem linked. Judicial control is either possible at each level of involvement where it took place (MS or EU) if the illegality of one procedural participatory act could have influenced the legality of a subsequent act in a composite procedure, or, judicial control is possible at the level of the final act. There, however, it would be best if it were for the court dealing with the final act to be able to review the legality of all previous composite procedural steps. In order to do that effectively, in absence of harmonised administrative procedural rules, it would be necessary to provide for preliminary reference procedures not only in the vertical relationship from national courts to the ECJ but also from the ECJ to national courts. Additionally, a form of horizontal preliminary reference procedure between different national courts would be necessary. This judicial network through procedures of preliminary references would be able to follow the emerging administrative networks and allow for effective judicial supervision of a network administration.
In summary, this contribution has led to the following understandings: Maintaining legality and effective supervision is a challenging task in the face of this ever evolving network structure. This task is only slowly being acknowledged in academic legal thinking. It is however a real and important challenge. The result of the necessarily limited considerations to a topic as vast as this, undertaken in this paper are firstly, that integrated administration and composite administrative procedures are the outcome of the approach to European integration in which administrative tasks are undertaken de-centrally with only very limited European administration. Insofar the EU is different from many federal states where both a parallel federal and state administration exist. The consequence of this specificity of European integration is that forms of supervision of administrative action need to be adapted to the specific nature of the administrative network. So far there are only very timid first steps to do so. The essential problem is to move beyond a simplistic two-level understanding of European integration with the EU and the Member States as distinct entities.
